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Abstract—The secure integration of renewable generation into 
modern power systems requires an appropriate assessment of 
the security of the system in real-time. The uncertainty 
associated with renewable power makes it impossible to tackle 
this problem via a brute-force approach, i.e. it is not possible to 
run detailed online static or dynamic simulations for all possible 
security problems and realizations of load and renewable power. 
Intelligent approaches for online security assessment with 
forecast uncertainty modeling are being sought to better handle 
contingency events. This paper reports the platform developed 
within the iTesla project for online static and dynamic security 
assessment. This innovative and open-source computational 
platform is composed of several modules such as detailed static 
and dynamic simulation, machine learning, forecast uncertainty 
representation and optimization tools to not only filter 
contingencies but also to provide the best control actions to 
avoid possible unsecure situations. Based on High Performance 
Computing (HPC), the iTesla platform was tested in the French 
network for a specific security problem: overload of 
transmission circuits. The results obtained show that forecast 
uncertainty representation is of the utmost importance, since 
from apparently secure forecast network states, it is possible to 
obtain unsecure situations that need to be tackled in advance by 
the system operator. 
Index Terms--Online Static/Dynamic Security Assessment, 
Uncertainty Modeling, Machine Learning, Renewable Power, 
High Performance Computing. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The operation of a transmission grid involves the need to 
check ahead that the proper functioning of the system is 
unaffected by any plausible contingency. In Europe, Regional 
Security Coordination Initiatives (RSCI), like Coreso, achieve 
such security analyses from two days ahead to operations. 
Generally, the analyses consist on the verification of the “N-1” 
rule and involves the deterministic forecasting of the grid state 
based on either controlled or uncontrolled variables. Coreso 
does not perform the forecast as these are received from 
individual Transmission System Operators (TSO) and merged 
into one common grid forecast. 
The increasing deployment of Renewable Energy Sources 
(RES) increases the forecast uncertainty and TSOs are 
incentivized to operate the system closer to its limits without 
jeopardizing the risk level. Traditionally, online dynamic 
security assessment (SA) has been carried out by using 
numerical methods that solve the algebraic and the differential 
equations of the power system components’ models [1] for 
plausible contingency events. Such methods are 
computationally intensive, which makes the online scanning 
of potential dynamic problems for real power systems an 
intractable task. Direct methods via Lyapunov or Energy 
Functions [2]-[4] have been proposed to overcome the 
computational burden of numerically simulating the evolution 
of the system following a disturbance. These methods are 
mathematically sound but have limited application (transient 
stability). More recently, machine learning-based methods 
were proposed as an alternative way to automatically infer the 
security level of the system following a disturbance. These 
techniques are trained offline for a wide-range of operation 
conditions and security problems. The parametrization of 
these methods is a computationally intensive task that requires 
the static and dynamic simulation of the system for each 
credible contingency and operation condition. After 
appropriately parametrized, these methods have the advantage 
of requiring little to no computational effort to infer the 
security of system states within a margin of error, requiring 
only the state of a limited set of variables as input. A good 
parametrization procedure makes sure that the classification 
error is minimal for operation conditions that might occur in 
the future. Amongst numerous machine learning methods 
available in the literature, Decision Trees (DTs) [5]-[7], 
Neural Networks [8]-[10], and Fuzzy Inference Systems 
[11][12], are the ones mostly used for online SA. 
More recently, researchers have proposed holistic 
frameworks [13]-[15] for SA that combine offline and online 
applications for assessing different phenomena (e.g. steady-
state violations, frequency stability, transient stability, voltage 
stability, small-signal stability) with uncertainty. These 
frameworks aim at bridging the gap between risk-based 
methods and traditional deterministic approaches, by 
introducing the concepts of probability and impact associated 
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to the contingencies as well as the uncertainty of the energy 
consumption forecast and of the RES power production. The 
ultimate goal of these frameworks is to devise overall 
architectures for online SA integrating probabilistic and 
deterministic concepts in a unified environment. 
This rationale has triggered the developments of the iTesla 
project1 which is co-funded by the European Commission 
Framework Program 7 (EC FP7). The project required the 
development of an online security analysis platform able (a) to 
cope with European-wide grid models, (b) to account for 
uncertainty and its impact on the implicit or explicit margins 
needed to ensure the wanted security level (c) to handle the 
curative remedial actions needed to reduce the margins that 
are necessary to face contingencies, and (d) to achieve both 
static and dynamic simulations in order to ensure the accurate 
evaluation of the security of the system when operated closer 
to its limits. An important prerequisite is the persistence of 
grid element identifiers, throughout time and also between 
forecast and snapshot (SN) operating scenarios, so that it is 
possible (a) to assess the uncertainties at nodal level and (b) to 
apply specific curative remedial actions stored into a catalogue 
associated with the grid model. This property can be ensured 
thanks to the Common Grid Model Exchange Standard 
(CGMES), which should be deployed throughout European 
TSOs in the years to come so that the operational deployment 
of the iTesla platform will be made possible. 
Validation tests have been defined and implemented for 
different test cases. An important step of the validation 
process is to make sure that the iTesla platform is able to 
produce outputs consistent with TSO operational knowledge. 
Overloaded lines after the occurrence of a contingency are 
commonly simulated and studied on the French network. 
Therefore, this security problem was selected to perform the 
first validation tests and the results are reported in this paper. 
This paper is structured as follows: first, an overview of the 
iTesla platform is presented in Section II; then, Section III 
describes the results obtained from the application of the 
iTesla platform to the online SA of a contingency in the 
French network; finally, Section IV presents general 
conclusions and points directions towards future work. 
II. THE ITESLA PLATFORM 
The iTesla platform is an open source and interoperable 
tool that supports operators in the SA of forecast situations 
from several hours ahead of operation up to near real time. 
Recommendations are also provided in terms of efficiency of 
curative remedial actions when they are needed. The iTesla 
platform is able to take into account the uncertainties affecting 
power injections, such as non-programmable RES and loads, 
and the dynamic behavior of the grid, thanks to a filtering 
approach that takes advantage of machine learning techniques. 
The computations are performed with two complementary 
workflows, namely the offline and the online workflows (see 
Fig. 1). The offline workflow builds (1) security rules and (2) 
uncertainty models for use in the online workflow: the 
security rules are applied to plausible states in the “uncertainty 
domain” of the forecast under analysis, to identify the 
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contingencies for which control actions are needed, while 
limiting the number of accurate network simulations to be 
performed online. Both workflows include different 
computation modules, each fulfilling a specific technical 
function such as power flow (PF) computation or time-domain 
simulation. 
 
Fig. 1. The iTesla platform architecture: the online and offline workflows 
A. Offline Computation of Security Rules 
The offline workflow is expected to be executed once 
every week in order to update the security rules with the latest 
information concerning possible system topological changes, 
general weather patterns, etc. As such, the set of security rules 
computed must be generic enough to enable classification of 
unseen operating conditions likely to occur over a span of a 
week. To achieve this goal, the offline platform is based on the 
triptych of anticipate-analyze-classify. The overall idea is to 
use simulations in order to sample the system’s security 
boundary. By extrapolating the information of historical data, 
predictive capability can be constructed that will support 
online operation. To this end, the iTesla platform generates a 
population of anticipated network states. The post-
contingency security of each state is then determined against a 
set of credible contingencies. Machine learning is finally 
applied to enable inference to other network states not seen in 
this training process. This way, generalizable security rules 
with high predictive capability can be constructed. These three 
steps are explained in more detail below. 
The first step of the offline workflow is to build a large 
population of network states that are likely to occur. Historical 
measurements from similar periods are used to inform a model 
that generates a very large number of scenarios. This process 
is split in two parts. Firstly, scenarios of different stochastic 
variable realizations (i.e. all variables beyond the operator’s 
control such as demand and wind power production) are built. 
This is done by fitting a sophisticated statistical model, based 
on Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Pair Copula 
Decomposition (PCD) with C-vines, to relevant historical data 
[16]. The constructed model is subsequently sampled at a high 
density. Each generated scenario is then transformed into a 
complete network state where all state variables (e.g. dispatch 
levels, substation topology, PF etc.) are defined. For this 
purpose, a state-of-the-art tool [17] comprised of four 
hierarchical optimization levels is run to infer the operator’s 
actions. The generated scenarios are consistent with what has 
been observed historically, but also capable of exploring 
marginal cases that have rarely occurred in the past. 
The second and most resource-intensive step is to analyze 
the impact of each credible contingency across all anticipated 
network states. This is done by carrying out a static and time-
domain simulation and investigating the impact of a particular 
asset failure event. The impact of a contingency on a pre-fault 
state is summarized through post-fault security indices that 
have been developed to detect steady-state and dynamic 
problems such as over/under-voltage, overloads, angular, 
small signal and voltage instability [18][19]. Note that this 
step can be a computational bottleneck due to the very large 
number of simulations required (1 million simulations arise 
when analyzing 1000 contingencies across 1000 network 
states). The iTesla platform’s excellent scaling capability has 
been verified in experiments using up to 10,000 cores [20]. 
The third and final step consists of applying a suitable 
machine learning algorithm. The results of millions of 
simulations are compressed into a set of security rules that are 
used online to classify unseen network states as secure or 
unsecure against specific contingencies in a very fast way. 
Note that a security rule is obtained for each contingency and 
security phenomenon (overloads, transient stability, etc.). 
Security rules are expressed as DTs [21] which have the 
advantage of being easily interpretable and suitable for 
integration as linear constraints into optimization tools. 
B. Offline Computation of Uncertainty Models 
Loads and RES forecast uncertainties are taken into 
account by defining probabilistic models of the forecast error 
i.e. of the difference between forecast values (e.g. evaluated 
on the day ahead) and values occurring in real operation SN. 
Forecast error models are synthesized, based on historical data 
series of these forecasts and SNs. These models account for: 
(a) Dependences between injections. For instance, several 
injections may be affected by similar errors, when the forecast 
is based on weather variables (sun radiation, wind; 
temperature). (b) Forecast values themselves (e.g. in case of 
very sunny or very cloudy weather, uncertainty on PV 
production will be small, and vice versa in case of partially 
clouded sky). 
The uncertainty modelling problem can be very 
complicated due to the high number of stochastic injections. 
Moreover, probability distributions of forecast errors are non-
Gaussian and their dependences are non-linear. The offline 
platform applies an approach based on PCA and PCD similar 
to the one discussed in subsection II.A to build a reasonable 
statistical model of forecast errors. Again, some computational 
time intensive operations on large historical datasets (e.g. 
matrix inversions) are performed offline to pre-compute some 
quantities to be used in the on-line platform. 
C. Online Security Assessment 
1) Monte Carlo-Like Approach 
Monte Carlo-Like Approach (MCLA) performs the 
sampling of the uncertainty domain around the forecast state, 
and then checks each new sampled state against the security 
rules. MCLA receives as input the forecast states with an 
associated uncertainty model computed offline, the list of 
contingencies and the security rules computed by the offline 
workflow. New plausible states are computed online from the 
forecast state by sampling the stochastic injections (loads and 
RES) and adjusting the conventional generation accordingly. 
Sampling “conditions” the forecast error model to the current 
forecast under analysis accounts for the dependence among 
conditioned variables. The adopted sampling technique limits 
the on-line computation burden by exploiting several 
quantities computed offline (see subsection II.A), Nataf 
transformation [22] and the properties of Gaussian conditional 
multivariates. This makes the technique suitable for online 
applications dealing with large sets of stochastic variables. 
The output of MCLA is the security assessment of each 
evaluated state with respect to the analyzed contingencies. 
2) Control Module for Remedial Action Identification 
Curative remedial actions are investigated for all the 
{state, contingency} couples resulting from the previous step 
labelled as unsecure without it. Security-Constrained Optimal 
Power Flow (SC-OPF) techniques are involved in this step. 
The optimization module includes a solver dedicated to 
topological reconfiguration. Topology and the related curative 
actions are modelled through binary variables in the nonlinear 
optimization problem. Thanks to an innovative method, this 
module is able to find, in a fast way, the necessary curative 
remedial actions to avoid current limits violation. An 
important element in that approach is the fact that a limited 
number of control actions are considered. Indeed, the choice 
has to be made between control actions that have been 
selected by the dispatchers and which are dedicated to the 
specific couple {contingency, violated constraints}. 
3) Detailed Network Simulation 
Static and time-domain simulation is carried out for the 
cases that either are not solved by the control module, or may 
exhibit stability problems. In this case, the security evaluation 
is obtained by applying the indices that were used to build the 
security rules. Additional testing, by simulating the 
effectiveness of the control action proposed by the control 
module, is also an option implemented in the platform.  
4) Fuzzy Power Flow Approach 
PF methodologies based on the fuzzy set theory can have 
advantages over the traditional probabilistic approaches since 
the former are able to model empirical knowledge not related 
to event repetition such as “load between 10 and 12 MW” or 
“generation around 50 MW”. A fuzzy number is a connected 
set or range of possible values, where each possible value 
within that set has a weight between 0 and 1. The aim of the 
Classic Fuzzy PF (FPF) [23] is to determine a membership 
function or, more simply, a fuzzy number for the bus voltage 
magnitude and angle as well as for the current and the 
apparent PF in the branches as a function of the fuzzy 
numbers specified for the active and reactive power injections. 
The Classic FPF method was imbedded in the iTesla 
platform. It accepts triangular fuzzy numbers for the active 
and reactive power injections as inputs and computes 
triangular fuzzy numbers for the output variables of interest. 
The central value of the fuzzy number corresponds to the 
output obtained from the AC PF. The FPF module is meant to 
be run in parallel to the mainstream of the online process. 
Hence, this module can support validation of the contingency 
filtering for static phenomena and shows the modularity of the 
iTesla platform to integrate new functionalities. The FPF 
module can be run for several contingency scenarios and 
computes a Security Index (SI) based on the physical limits of 
the variables (e.g. maximum and minimum voltage 
magnitude) as follows 
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where f is the membership function and PBL and PBH are, 
respectively, the lower and upper physical limits of the 
variable under analysis. Note that the SI belongs to the interval 
[0,1]. If the security index is 1, then the fuzzy number 
computed is completely within the interval defined by its 
physical limits. Alternatively, a SI of 0 indicates that the fuzzy 
number is completely outside the physical boundaries of the 
variable. If the SI takes a value within the interval ]0,1[, then 
there is a possibility that the boundaries might be violated: the 
greater the security index, the smaller the violation possibility. 
D. Computational Implementation 
A high-end software framework was developed to handle 
the heavy computations required by not-deterministic security 
analysis, especially the ones of the offline module in the case 
(not shown in the current article) where a dynamic simulator is 
used instead of a PF tool. The platform, whose core is in Java2, 
is modular so as to ease the distribution of computations, 
through a High Performance Computing (HPC) layer built on 
top of a Message Passing Interface (MPI), and the replacement 
of modules (for example, the replacement of one PF tool by 
another). It provides common services such as data 
management, data conversion, data mining, task management 
and graphical user interfaces. MongoDB was used to store 
injection and withdrawal chronicles extracted from grid 
models and to compute statistical indicators like quantiles for 
uncertainty analysis. Moreover, the platform contains a data 
model for static and dynamic power system data (IIDM - 
iTesla Internal Data Model) and several conversion services 
between this data model and external formats (UCTE-DEF, 
CIM Profile 1, Eurostag, PSS/E). As mentioned earlier, the 
scaling of computation time was tested up to 10,000 cores. 
III. CASE STUDY 
Several contingency scenarios in the French network were 
analyzed in order to validate the iTesla platform for the 
overload security problem. This analysis consisted on the 
simulation of short-circuits in a single or double 400 kV line 
that lead to the line disconnection, which may create overload 
problems in the neighboring 225 kV lines and, therefore, are 
monitored by RTE on a regular basis. This section presents the 
results obtained for one of these contingencies in order to 
illustrate the functionalities and extent of results provided by 
the iTesla platform. 
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Simulations were performed in the EHV part of the French 
network, by assuming that the boundary nodes are connected 
to fictitious loads reflecting the flows in the interconnections 
and in the HV network. Hence, the French network was 
reduced to 1416 substations, 427 generators, 1952 loads, 168 
shunts and about 1700 nodes depending on the situation. The 
stochastic variables comprise the active and reactive power 
injection of loads and RES totaling 3798 variables. The 
historical data used was Day-Ahead Congestion Forecast 
(DACF) and SN files, in CIM Profile 1 format, with persistent 
identifiers for equipment regardless of the time and type of file 
(DACF and SN). The iTesla platform detects unsecure 
situations due to overload by comparing the post-contingency 
steady-state current in all the lines and transformers with its 
operational limits in the CIM file: if at least one limit is 
violated, then the situation is considered unsecure. 
A. Offline Computation of Security Rules 
1) Methodology for DTs Parametrization/Evaluation 
The security rules obtained to detect overload problems in 
the French network were computed with the DATAmaestro®3 
software that was integrated in the iTesla platform. For each 
contingency/security index pair, this module computes DTs 
with alternative values for the training parameters, namely the 
alpha (α) and the true threshold (tT) parameters. The α value 
allows controlling the size of the tree, by defining the 
minimum statistical significance (i.e. 0/1 means never/always 
significant) required to split nodes. Usually the optimal value 
of α is quite independent of the learning set and of specific 
problems of the disturbance, such as type, location and size of 
the system [24]. According to [25], the optimum value for α 
lies between [0.00005; 0.001]. The tT value defines how the 
security rule is generated from the DT structure. For not pure 
leaves, tT defines the threshold for the proportion of secure 
learning states to produce a secure prediction. 
For the parametrization/selection of the best DT for each 
contingency/security index pair, a quasi-automatic procedure 
was applied comprising the following steps: (a) change the 
training parameters of the DT; (b) DT training with the k-fold 
cross validation method [21] for a 20% test set size; (c) 
evaluation of the DT performance by analyzing the training 
misclassification errors, the DT structure visualization and the 
geographical visualization of the DT. From this procedure, a 
set of alternative DTs is obtained and the best DT is selected 
according to several criteria. The highest priority criterion is to 
maximize the accuracy of the DT to detect unsecure situations, 
which is achieved by minimizing the Missed Alarms (MA) 
(i.e. unsecure state/contingency pairs for which the DT 
provided a secure classification). Hence, the number of MA 
must be, at least, reduced to a controlled risk by minimizing 
the following indicator: Probability of MA = 
#ucs/(#ucs+#scs), where #ucs is the number of unsecure states 
classified secure and #scs is the number of well classified 
secure states. 
An additional important criterion is to maximize the 
efficiency of the DTs in detecting secure situations, which 
aims at maximizing the filtering capability of the online part. 
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This is achieved by minimizing the False Alarms (FA) 
situations (i.e. secure state/contingency pairs for which the DT 
provided an unsecure classification) and also by maximizing 
the following mathematical indicator: DT filtering capability = 
(#ucs+#scs)/(#states), where #states is the number of states. 
 
Fig. 2. Visual comparison between historical and sampled stochastic data 
 
Legend: Green is the proportion of secure learning states; Orange is the proportion of unsecure 
learning states; Red is the error rate of the testing set used at the time of training. 
Fig. 3. DT structure (obtained with  = 0.0005 and tT = 0.98) 
Avoiding DTs over-fitting to the learning states was also 
pursued in order to have a good generalization capability and 
obtain accurate estimations for unseen states. The over-fitting 
problem was controlled by: (a) not letting the testing set errors 
to be significantly higher than the learning set errors; (b) to 
avoid a tree structure that includes, in their splitting tests, 
operation conditions that have no relationship with the 
security problem under analysis. Finally, the DT parametrized 
was further evaluated with historical data not used for training 
to assess its generalization capability. 
2) Execution of the iTesla Platform 
The offline part of the iTesla platform was run by using 
the SN of January 2013 to sample stochastic variables and 
create realistic network states using optimization. Then, for 
each network state sampled, the post-contingency state was 
computed to produce a large data set of pre-analyzed states for 
the parametrization/selection of the best DTs. Finally, the DTs 
were applied to all the SN and DACF of February 2013 to 
assess the generalization capabilities of the DTs. The 
computations were run on 2 x Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2670 
0 @ 2.60GHz processors (16 cores) and 128 GB of RAM. 
3) Validation of the Sampling of Stochastic Variables 
The iTesla platform contains a tool that allows a visual 
comparison between the historical SN used for sampling and 
the sampled states, in the form of plots on relevant sets of the 
stochastic variables. Good quality sampling is obtained when 
these plots reveal a similar dependence structures between 
historical SN and the sampled states. Fig. 2 presents some of 
the plots obtained for aggregated stochastic variables. The 
variable in x-axis of this figure, var1, represents the 
summation of the first half of the stochastic variables (from 1 
to 1899), whereas the variable in the y-axis, var2, comprises 
the summation of the second half of stochastic variables (from 
1900 to 3798). Note that the left plot represents the historical 
data and the right plot was obtained for the sampled data. For 
easier detection of outliers, these plots also present the convex 
hull of each dataset (in black for historical and in gray for 
sampled data). 
 
Legend:  #ucu = #Unsecure classified Unsecure; #scs = #Secure classified Secure; #scu = 
#Secure classified Unsecure; #ucs = #Unsecure classified Secure 
Fig. 4. k-fold cross validation statistics of the DT 
 
Fig. 5. Geographical visualization of the DT 
The following statistics are also provided to assist the 
visual comparison: Pearson’s correlation (r); Kendall’s tau 
rank correlation () and Spearman’s rho (). These plots show 
that between historical and sampled data: (a) the stochastic 
aggregated variables occupy roughly the same area of the state 
space; (b) the dependence structure is largely the same. Hence, 
the results presented illustrate that the generated sampled 
stochastic variables seem consistent with the input historical 
data (SN). 
4) Decision Tree Validation Process 
The DT structure obtained for one of the analyzed 
contingencies is presented in Fig. 3. (short-circuit in a 
transmission line leading to its disconnection). This DT was 
generated with a data set of 1384 pre-analyzed network states, 
comprising 66% of secure states for the analyzed contingency. 
The obtained k-fold cross validation statistics for this DT are 
presented in Fig. 4. From these statistics, the obtained DT 
misclassification errors seem being reduced to a controlled 
risk. Namely, the obtained k-fold cross validation errors 
comprise 1% of MA states and 2% of FA states, defining a 
probability of MA of 2.1% and a DT filtering capability of 
65% (very close to the 66% of secure states in the data set). 
The geographical visualization of the analyzed DT is 
presented in Fig. 5 (image anonymized due to confidentiality 
issues). This image shows the geographical location of the 
network equipment involved in the contingency (highlighted 
in red) and the equipment involved in the security rule 
(highlighted in pink for the equipment’s used to classify a pre-
selected network situation and in orange for the remaining 
ones). From this image, it was possible to verify that: (a) The 
first split of the DT defines a threshold for the active power 
flow in the transmission line that may become overloaded 
after this contingency (information obtained from TSO 
expertise); (b) The remaining split of the DT defines a 
threshold for the active power in the transmission line where 
the contingency was simulated. These results demonstrate that 
the operating conditions involved in the DT structure are 
strongly related with the analyzed security problem and, 
therefore, validate the quality of the DT. 
 
Fig. 6. 2D 4-color plots for the SN of February 2013 
 
Fig. 7. Overall, daily and hourly performance for the SN of Feb/2013 
5) Decision Tree Generalization Capability 
The generalization capabilities of the best DT obtained for 
the selected contingency was used to classify the SN and 
DACF of February 2013. By comparing the DT classification 
results with the true state classification, it was possible to 
obtain the following statistics: #ucu: number of well classified 
unsecure states; #scs: number of well classified secure states; 
#ucs: number of unsecure states classified secure (number of 
MA); #scu: number of secure states classified unsecure 
(number of FA). Moreover, to help at visualizing the results of 
this statistical analysis, a 4-color 2D plot was created (see Fig. 
6) which was obtained after using the DT depicted in Fig. 3 to 
classify the SN of February 2013 (plot labelled Historical). 
Fig. 6 also presents the same results for the states used to train 
the DT (plot labelled Samples).  
The variables selected as axis of the 4-color 2D plot are 
the two most important attributes used by the DT to sort out 
the secure states from the unsecure ones. The color code used 
in this figure is the one also used in the pie chart of Fig. 4. The 
dashed lines correspond to the security thresholds defined by 
the DT. These plots allow to visualize the security domain and 
the relative distance of the ucu, scs, ucs and scu from the 
thresholds assigned to the variables of the DT. What is more, 
these plots allow to infer the appropriateness of the DT to 
classify new states by checking the relative location of these 
new states from the security domain. If the new states 
(Historical plot) are outside the zone defined by the training 
states (Samples plot), we can postulate that the DT is not being 
used within its validity domain. 
 
Fig. 8. Overall, daily and hourly performance for the DACF of Feb/2013 
Fig. 6 shows that the set of historical SN is biased towards 
the secure area of the space, showing that February 2013 was 
considerably more secure than January 2013. Moreover, note 
that there is a low number of MA and FA in the SN of 
February 2013 and their location is near the security boundary. 
Hence, it can be deduced that this DT bears sufficient 
generalization capability to satisfactorily split the region of 
secure states from the region of unsecure ones. To 
complement the information in Fig. 6, Fig. 7 plots the overall, 
daily and hourly distribution of the correctly and incorrectly 
classified SN of February 2013. Note that only 5 MA are 
provided during the entire month, which proves the good 
performance of the DT for this particular contingency and 
security problem. Besides, from the daily summary, it is 
possible to realize that a few unsecure situations occurred in 
the end of February 2013. In order to evaluate the quality of 
the DT with more realistic conditions, the former analysis was 
also carried out for the DACF of February 2013. The overall, 
daily and hourly distribution of the FA and MA are presented 
in Fig. 8. These results indicate that this DT provides good 
generalization capabilities not only for SN but also for DACF. 
B. Online Security Assessement with Uncertainty 
1) Monte Carlo Like Approach to detect state security 
The DT generated by the offline workflow of the iTesla 
platform was used to perform online SA of the analyzed 
contingency and security problem, including the uncertainties 
provided by the MCLA. For validation purposes, this 
procedure was applied to the DACFs of the 25 and 27 of 
February 2013, since these were the most unsecure days 
forecasted for this month (see Fig. 8). The forecast error 
model of stochastic variables was calculated by comparing the 
DACF of January 2013 with the SN of the same month. For 
validation purposes, the DT classification results were 
compared with the true state classification which was provided 
after the detailed simulation of the contingency analyzed. The 
MCLA results obtained for the DACFs of day 27 are 
summarized in Fig. 9. The top bar plot presents the DT 
statistics for each DACF forecasted for that day. The bottom 
column chart presents the DT statistics obtained for the same 
DACF, but now including the 100 states generated by the 
MCLA to model the uncertainty around the DACF. In order to 
better evaluate these results, a 2D 4-color plot was generated 
for the 100 samples and the DACF in the security domain of 
the DT. These plots are shown in Fig. 10 for four relevant 
situations in which: (a) the blue cross defines the location of 
the DACF (base case); (b) the dots describe the location of the 
MCLA samples (uncertainty). 
 
Fig. 9. DT statistics for all DACFs of 27/Feb/2013, including uncertainty 
 
[DACF: 2:30 27/Feb/2013] [DACF: 12:30 27/Feb/2013] 
 
[DACF: 18:30 27/Feb/2013] [DACF: 19:30 27/Feb/2013] 
Fig. 10. Plots for some DACF of Feb/2013, including uncertainty 
The results of Fig. 9 show that, when considering the 
forecast uncertainty, only a small number of states are FA 
(namely, for the DACF at 12:30, 13:30 and 18:30). Besides, 
there are some MA situations, namely at 8:30 which are, 
however, not critical since the DACF originating these MAs 
is, for most of its uncertainty domain, an unsecure situation 
and also because the overload problem is, in fact, smaller than 
1% for most of the MAs. In addition, if the DACF is not 
located close to the security boundaries (see the DACF 
detailed in Fig. 10 at 2:30 and 19:30), all states sampled by 
MCLA share the same classification as the originating DACF. 
However, there are two DACFs in Fig. 10 (namely, at 12:30 
and 18:30), in which it was possible to observe that, from an 
apparently secure situation (i.e. from a DACF with no 
overload problems) there is a considerable amount of unsecure 
states when the forecast uncertainty is taken into account. 
These results demonstrate the utmost need of including 
uncertainty when performing online SA. 
2) Fuzzy Power Flow as Additional Uncertainty 
Representation 
To validate the FPF approach, the FPF module integrated 
in the iTesla platform was applied for the same security 
problem and DACFs used to test the MCLA (see the previous 
section). The analysis of the FPF results was carried out 
aiming to compare the fuzzy uncertainty representation with 
the one provided by the MCLA, namely: (a) to detect if the 
states sampled by the MCLA are inside or outside the 
uncertainty region defined by the FPF for the two most 
important variables in the DT; (b) and to compare the 
classification of the DACF according to the Security Index 
(SI) defined for the FPF results. The fuzzy injections used as 
inputs, i.e. the uncertainty around each injection represented as 
a fuzzy triangular number, was obtained by using the mean 
and standard deviation extracted from the uncertainty 
distribution computed offline by the forecast error module. 
The lowest and highest values of the fuzzy number were 
computed from the central one, by subtracting and adding one 
standard deviation of the underlying uncertainty distribution.  
 
Fig. 11. Pre-contingency uncertainty defined by the MCLA and the FPF 
To highlight the functionalities of the FPF module, the 
results obtained for one of DACFs analyzed are also 
presented, namely, for the 18:30 of the 27/Feb/2013 (see 
MCLA results in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10). The pre-contingency 
uncertainty characterization obtained by the MCLA as well as 
by the FPF module are presented in Fig. 11. This figure shows 
that all states sampled by the MCLA (dots) are included in the 
fuzzy region (external triangular shapes), which means that the 
results of FPF can be used as an upper bound for the MCLA 
uncertainty representation. Similar results were obtained for 
all the remaining tested DACFs of the French network. 
The post-contingency fuzzy current, obtained for the 
transmission line that may become overloaded after the 
contingency leads to an SI of 0.6. This result indicates an 
unsecure DACF since the branch fuzzy current violates its 
maximum physical limit. This is consistent with the unsecure 
classification provided by the MCLA, since roughly 20% of 
the MCLA states were unsecure. The same consistency 
between secure/unsecure classifications with the MCLA and 
FPF were obtained for all tested DACFs. Therefore, it can be 
inferred that the FPF module tested is able to provide correct 
classifications for contingencies that result in overloaded 
equipment. Moreover, the fuzzy uncertainty representation 
was proven to be complementary and an upper bound to the 
probabilistic representation, which can be exploited to filter 
out contingencies before applying the MCLA. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has presented the fundamentals of the platform 
developed, within the iTesla project, for improving the 
operation security of the network under load and renewable 
generation uncertainty. The ultimate goal of the platform 
developed is to support the decision making process during 
network operation from two-days ahead to real time based on 
three main features: (a) to provide a risk-based assessment 
taking into account different sources of uncertainties (e.g. load 
and renewable power generation) and contingency probability; 
(b) to perform accurate and fast online SA using time-domain 
simulations and machine learning techniques; (c) to provide 
operators with relevant proposals of preventive and curative 
actions to keep the system in a secure state. As a shared tool, 
the iTesla platform, whose code has been released open-
source on Github (MPL 2.0 license), will help TSOs to 
address SA of their own system, of coordinated regional 
systems or of continental systems such as the whole Pan-
European network. 
The iTesla platform was validated for a well-studied 
security issue in the French network: overload situations in 
transmission circuits. Several contingency events were 
analyzed, involving a short-circuit in a single or double 400 
kV line resulting in line disconnection. These events can 
create overload problems in the neighboring 225 kV lines, and 
therefore are regularly monitored by RTE. The results 
obtained have demonstrated the need to capture forecast 
uncertainty since unsecure operating situations can arise from 
apparently secure forecast network states. Alternative, 
uncertainty representations based on Fuzzy Set Theory have 
also been explored in the iTesla platform. The results obtained 
haven shown a complementariness between fuzzy and 
probabilistic forecast uncertainty representation that can be 
exploited for static contingency filtering and improve the 
computational performance of the platform. 
Finally, the offline workflow will be improved so that 
security rules are generated with their corresponding validity 
domain. The online workflow uncertainty module will be 
tested in quasi-real time experimentations at RTE. It will be 
assessed that the measured flows on some important lines is in 
accordance with the forecasted flow distributions. Last but not 
least, curative remedial actions will be simulated –either 
statically or dynamically– before the security indexes are 
evaluated so as to avoid classifying as “unsecure” a situation 
and a contingency for which curative remedial actions are pre-
planned. It will improve the filtering capability and limit the 
call to the control module for remedial action identification to 
the most complex cases. 
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